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CASE NOTES
DUTY OF TRUSTEE TO INSURE PROPERTY DEEDED TO HIM FOR

PURPOSE OF SALE.-Does a duty to insure devolve upon a trustee
in a deed of trust for purpose of sale ? The Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia answered this question in the negative
in Kile v. Forman,' a case involving a deed of trust to the defendant, Forman, of the legal title solely for the purpose of
selling the property upon request of the beneficiaries. The deed
of trust was in the nature of a mortgage, the grantor remaining in possession and control of the property. There was no
provision in the trust instrument imposing upon the trustee
the obligation to insure the premises.. In pursuance of the trust
the grantee advertised the property for sale. The sale, however, was restrained by a bill filed in a chancery proceeding to
purge the secured debt of usury. The effect of the restraining
order was to postpone the sale during the proceedings, which
continued for more than two years. Meanwhile the court ordered that the trustee insure the buildings and that the premium
be taxed as costs of the suit. In compliance with the order of the
court, the trustee caused the buildings to be insured for one
year. On the day after the insurance expired the buildings were
burned. The grantor, on behalf of himself and the beneficiaries
1 113 W. Va. 313, 167 S. E. 744 (Feb. 7, 1933).
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under the deed of trust, sued the trustee for the loss resulting
from the trustee's failure to renew the insurance, the theory of
the plaintiff's case being that the trustee breached his duty by
not keeping the property insured. 2 A decree which overruled a
demurrer was reversed on appeal.
Where there is no duty it is plain there can be no breach. The
initial inquiry is whether there was a duty. The pleadings in
the case indicated that the trustee was clothed with the legal
title merely for the purpose of selling the property when the
beneficiaries should request him to do so. There was no showing
that the trustee had funds in his hands with which to pay for
insurance on the property. It may be assumed, therefore, that
there was no express requirement in the deed of trust that the
trustee insure the premises. Was it, then, to be implied? It -is
established that the trust itself, whatever its character, constitutes the charter of the extent of the trustee's powers and
duties.3 The grantor may very properly require the trustee to
insure the trust property and keep it insured while he holds it
for the purpose of making a sale, provided he apprises the
trustee of that duty in the instrument conferring the power
upon him, and provided the trustee accepts the obligation thereunder and provision is made to reimburse him for the expense.
In a carefully drawn trust instrument one would expect to find
directions respecting insurance of the trust property, and the
use and application of the proceeds in case of damage or destruction by fire, which directions are binding upon the trustee. But
in the absence of directions to insure, whether such omission is
by accident or by design, a reasonable person cannot require a
trustee to take upon himself the burden -of curing the defect
and make him responsible for loss resulting from a. failure to
do so..
We may start with the proposition: that directions in a trust
-agreement furnish the sole guide to the conduct of the trustee,
directions in -the absence' of
and he must follow strictly those
4
conferred discretionary powers.
The duties and powers of Forman in ihis:case sprang from an
instrument, which clothed him with a power -of: sale. It is elementary that the powers of trustees under deeds of trust with
pQwer of sale depend entirely on the terms of the deeds. "A
power of sale,. like all other powers, can be exercised only in the
2 The power of the. court to require the trustee to insure is discussed in 39
West Virginia Law Quarterly 364.
•
I1, sec. 1062.
8 John Norton Pomeroy, Jr., A Treatise on Equity_ Jurisprudence, (4th Ed.)
426 R. C. L., p. 1372; Bryson v. Bryson, 62 Cal. App. 170, 216 P. 391 (1923).
5
Jairus Ware Perry, A Treatise on the Law of Trusts and Trustees, (7th
Ed.) II, sec. 602g; Carter v. Carter, 87 W. Va. 254, 104 S. E. 558 (1920).
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mode, and upon the exact conditions, terms, and occasions prescribed in the instrument of trust .... ",6 A power to sell is not
an incidental to the office of trustee, for the theory of a trust
in the beginning contemplated the trustee's holding and caring
for the trust property to avoid feudal dues and incidents, and
nothing more. 7 If, then, the duty to insure was not imposed by
the deed of trust, it cannot be said to have been incidental to
the power to sell, for we have seen that a power of sale is like
all other powers and can be exercised only in conformity with
the requirements of the document which creates it. Certainly a
power to insure is no more incidental to the office of trustee
than a power of sale.
Where the grantor has parted with his title to property and'
has given to the trustee the management and possession of it,
good business judgment would seem to dictate that the trustee
insure it against loss.8 But where the trustee is not in possession
of the property and is not expressly charged with its complete
management, it is difficult to-find a basis for imposing upon him
the duty to insure the premises. If a duty to insure may be implied from a mere power to sell, why may not a duty to mortgage,
to lease, to exchange, to repair or to make improvements be
implied from such power? If we admit the soundness of this
proposition, we must with equal breadth of mind concede that
the limits of the implied powers and duties of trustees will be
defined and bounded only by the grantor's fancy. But it is settled that a power to sell does not include a power to mortgage, 9
nor to lease,' 0 nor to exchange.'1 The implied-power of a trustee
to make repairs will not be extended beyond such repairs as are
necessary to preserve the trust -estate. "Regard should be had
to the probable duration of the trust, in determining whether
temporary and slight, or more permanent and thorough repairs,
should be made. "12
In an Iowa case's the trust agreement gave the trustee full
6 Perry on Trusts, see. 783.
7 Augustus Peabody Loring, A Trustee's Handbook, pp. 64-5.
s Perry on Trusts, sec. 527.
9 Austin v. Parker, 317 Ill. 348, 148 N. E. 19 (1925); First National Bank
v. National Broadway Bank, 156 N.- Y. 459, 471, 51 N. E. 398 (1898) ; Heiseman
v. Lowenstein, 113 Ark. 404, 169 S. W. 224 (1914).
1o Seymour v. Bull, 3 Day (Conn.) 388.
11 Holsapple v. Schrontz, 65 Ind. App. 390, 117 N. E. 547 (1917):
"Power to sell trust property does not authorize a trustee to barter or exchange it for other property. Such power can only be exercised in conformity
with the requirements of the instrument by which the trust is created and in
furtherance of the ends to be attained by the creation of the trust."
12 Rathbun v. Colton, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 471, 484 (1834).
'3 Booth v. Bradford, 114 Iowa, 562, 87 N. W. 685 (1901), cited in Russell v.
Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 145 A. 648 (1929).
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power to dispose of the property and handle it as his own, the
proceeds to be applied to specific debts of the cestui. It was
expressly provided that the trustee should be repaid any money
or expenses advanced in his efforts to protect and dispose of the
property. The trustee expended a sum for repairs and improvements, which the court disallowed, saying: "A trustee cannot
ordinarily make improvements, and charge the cost thereof to
the beneficiary, unless clearly authorized by the instrument creating the trust. . . He will, however, be allowed for repairs
when such repairs are necessary to the preservation of the estate ....

We do not think the trust agreement contemplated the

making of permanent improvements, and are constrained to hold
that defendant has not made such a showing with reference to
repairs as that he should be allowed therefor."
In the principal case the trustee had advertised the property
for sale, but he was restrained from consummating the sale by
the act of the grantor in the usury proceeding. How did this
action of the grantor affect the duty of the trustee? If no duty
existed when the trust agreement was made and the duties of the
trustee were undertaken, it cannot be said that other and more
extensive duties were imposed when the grantor restrained the
sale. The position of the grantor remained unchanged so far as
the rents and profits were concerned, for it is not denied that he
continued to receive them. Is there any basis for saying that the
trustee's position should become more onerous by reason of the
grantor's act in restraining the sale? "In determining whether
the acts of a trustee have been prudent, within the meaning of
the rule, we must 'look at the facts as they exist at the time of
their occurrence, not aided or enlightened by those which subsequently take place' (per Peckham, J., in Purdy v. Lynch, 145
N. Y. 462, 475, 40 N. E. 232, 236); for it is an obvious truth
that 'a wisdom developed after an event, and having it and its
consequences as a source, is a standard no man should be judged
by' (per Collin, J., in Costello v. Costello, 209 N. Y. at page 262,
103 N. E. 148, 152); and it is impossible to say that trustees are
wanting in sound discretion 'simply because their judgment
J., in Green v. Crapo, 181 Mass.
turned out wrong' (per Holmes,
'
55, 58, 62 N. E. 956, 957). "14
The defendant's duty to insure the premises must emanate
from the deed of trust and not from the grantor's subsequent act
or from the action of the chancellor in making an order which
required the trustee to obtain the insurance. The fact that Forman complied with the court's order and actually procured the
insurance for one year can have no bearing on the case so far
as his duty to the grantor is concerned. "The powers of trustees
14 Re Fulton Trust Company of New York, 257 N. Y. 132, 177 N. E. 397, 77
A. L. R. 499, 502 (1931).
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under deeds of trust . . depend entirely upon the terms of the
deeds. Such powers are created by, and exist in, the deeds, and
of course they exist in the terms in which they are created, and
in no others. . . . They can be exercised because they are conferred by one party upon another, and not because the law or
the courts have conferred or authorized them." 15 The directions
of the court in a proceeding instituted by persons interested in
the property are imperative, and for a refusal or neglect to obey
them a trustee is liable to punishment. 16 Forman would likewise have been liable to punishment for failing to comply with
the order of the chancellor if the order was proper.
An English text writer states that "an executor has been held
not to be answerable for having omitted to secure the safety of
leasehold premises by insuring them against fire. 17 One of the
distinctions between the estate of an executor and that of a
trustee is in its duration. But where the trust is one to sell
property, which in the ordinary course should be discharged
without unusual delay, it can be said that the statement quoted
will apply equally to such trustee and that he should not be answerable for an omission to insure the premises against fire,
unless distinctly specified in the deed. The same writer states
that a trustee is bound to make good the loss where he has suffered a policy to lapse through neglect to pay the premium, but
he qualifies this by the provision that the trustee must have funds
in hand for payment of the premiums, "for if he had none, and
could procure none, he would be exempt from liability.''18 Forman had no funds in hand to pay the insurance premium and
the effect of the chancellor's order that he insure was, as the
Supreme Court of Appeals said, to require him to "advance
money out of his own pocket, or to secure a credit from a third
party," which the chancellor had no right to do. There are
numerous cases which hold that a trustee is personally liable
for materials ordered by him for the trust estate and on contracts
made by him in its behalf, unless there be a special agreement to
look only to the trust, and this even though the trustees acted
under the court's order.' 9
.

15 Perry on Trusts, sec. 602g.
10 Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 1064.
17 Lewin's Practical Treatise on the Law of Trusts (13th Ed.), p. 274.
18 Ibid., p. 945.
19 Taylor v. Mayo, 110 U. S. 330, 335 (1884) ; Dantzler v. McInnis, 151 Ala.
289, 44 So. 193 (1907) ; Johnson v. Leman et al., 131 Ill. 609, 23 N. E. 435
(1890). The latter was a suit by a broker against the trustee of the Sherman
House property in Chicago for commission earned in negotiating a loan for the
best interests of the estate. In refusing to hold the estate liable, even though
the services were useful to it, the court said:
"The general rule is, that the expenses of properly administering a trust are
a lien, on behalf of the trustee, on the estate in his hands, and he will not be

/
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It is true that courts have held that in some cases the. duty
to maintain reasonable insurance devolved upon the trustees, but
these were situations where the trust was more comprehensive
than the one under consideration here and where the nature
of the trust justified the holding. One of these decisions was
Stamford Trust Company v. Mack,20 where the testator left a
fund to defray the taxes on real estate and the expense of insurance during the continuance of the trust. When the fund became exhausted the trustee had no money at hand for the purposes stated and it became necessary to resort to either the principal or income of another fund or to sell a portion of the realty.
Upon the trustee's seeking the direction of the court it was held
to be the trustee's duty to maintain reasonable insurance on the
property, the will having made an express bequest to pay taxes,
insurance, and keep the land free of incumbrances, and that the
trustee had power to sell a part of the realty to defray the cost
of the insurance and to pay the taxes. This case is readily distinguishable from the present case in that the trustee in the
Stamford case, in addition to the power of sale, was under the
duty to maintain the building for the use of the testator's nieces
and nephews while they remained unmarried or widowed, while
in the West Virginia case the trustee's power of sale was not
coupled with any such duty of maintenance but was solely to
dispose of the property upon proper request of the beneficiaries.
Furthermore, the object of a trust to sell is the disposition of
the property, and, in the absence of express provision for the
necessary incidents of maintenance and preservation, such as
repairs and insurance, these do not attach. Where the trustee
is invested with the control and management of the property
and the object of the trust is to keep the estate intact for a particular purpose, it is but natural to presume that the trustor
intended that the trustee keep the property in repair and provide
insurance. Any other conclusion would defeat the purpose of
the trust.
compelled to part with his control of that estate until such expenses are paid.
But this, unless it may be in exceptional cases, does not extend to persons employed by the trustee. In general, their only remedy for compensation is personal, against the trustee employing them." See also Hussey v. Arnold, 185
Mass. 202, 204, 70 N. E. 87 (1904), and People v. Abbott, 107 N. Y. 225, 13
N. E. 779 (1887). Griggs v. Nadeau, 221 F. 381 (C. C. A. 8th Cir., 1915),
was a case where a broker sought to charge the estate of a decedent resident
of Illinois for services in procuring purchasers for the Minnesota lands belonging to the estate. A judgment was rendered against two individuals as
executors of the estate of King, deceased. The district court reversed the judgment, holding that an executor or administrator is without power to bind the
estate he represents by his individual contract, unless expressly authorized by
the will or by statute, or by an order of the probate court in which the administration is pending. A person thus employed, in the absence of such authority, must look to the executor, individually, who employed him.
2091 Conn. 620, 101 A. 235 (1917).
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"Trustees invested with general powers of control and management are not bound to strict limitations; they are justified
in making ordinary repairs and improvements and insuring the
property, and are allowed to hold the estate until reimbursed ...."21 Although the limitations are not so close where
the trustee has general powers of management and control of
real estate, yet even in such cases he cannot, in making repairs,
of the case, at the risk of having his
go beyond the necessity
22
expenses disallowed.
In the principal case, since there was no express obligation that
the trustee insure the property and the trust was not one which
required the maintenance of the property, can it be argued that
the assumption by the trustee of the duties of his office made him
an insurer of the property? The cases hold to the contrary and
justify the statement that the trustee is not an insurer of trust
funds or property, and is not answerable for losses not attributable to lack of fidelity or failure to exercise the care and
prudence which ordinary men exercise in managing their own
affairs, as where loss results from an error of judgment. Physicians and lawyers acting in good faith are not held accountable
for normal errors of judgment-all the more reason then why
a trustee, in all probability a layman, should not be held for
similar errors.
It must not be forgotten that the sale was delayed for more
than two years by the action of the grantor. In his suit against
the trustee, the grantor purported to act on behalf of himself
and the beneficiaries under the trust, and it is fair to presume
that the persons interested in the sale consented to its postponement. There are cases which hold that where disaster follows
a course which was assented to by2 3the beneficiaries the trustee
cannot be chargeable for the loss.
Textwriters, in commenting upon the trustee's duty to insure,
express favor for the view that the trustee "may" insure
where the trust instrument does not expressly require it, if continued management of property is involved, but there is no positive statement that the trustee is bound to insure. "A trustee
would probably be justified in insuring the property, and in
case of loss the insurance money would belong to the cestui que
trust; but where there is a tenant for life entitled to the income,
it would be safer to have such tenant's consent before paying
the premium out of his income. A mortgagee cannot insure at
the expense of the mortgagor without a special stipulation to
Note to Johnson v. Leman, 131 II. 609 in 19 Am. St. Rep. 63, 71.
Bridge v. Brown, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 181, 63 Eng. Rep. 79 (1843).
23 Swaine v. Hemphill, 165 Mich. 561, 131 N. W. 68 (1911).
Pearson v.
Gillenwaters, 99 Tenn. 446, 42 S. W. 9 (1897), petition for rehearing denied,
99 Tenn. 462, 42 S. W. 199.
21
22
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that effect; and if he insures without such stipulation, he can'
not charge the premiums to the mortgagor in his accounts. 24
This sentence is pertinent here, since the deed of trust was in the
nature of a mortgage.
It is not disputed that if Forman, the trustee, had himself
neglected to sell or offer the property for sale for a period of
two years and the loss by fire had occurred in the meantime, he
would be answerable for the loss. 25 But there was no such neglect
here. The court was right in refusing to hold the trustee liable.
The effect of a contrary holding would be to render trustees
extremely reluctant to assume duties of the character involved
here, and thereby incur liabilities which they could not have
contemplated when they assumed the trust. Such an extension
otf the liability arising from the assumption of a duty to take title
to, and sell property for, the benefit of third persons is contrary
to the well-recognized limits of trustees' obligations in such
cases, is unwarranted by the nature of the trust, and is unsupported by sound reason.
IN A FORECLOSURE PROCEEDING BROUGHT BY A TRUSTEE, ARE
THE HOLDERS OF BONDS SECURED BY THE TRUST DEED NECESSARY

OR PROPER PARTIES TO THE SUIT ?-In the case of Firebaugh v.
Traff et al.,' recently decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois,
the court passed upon the question as to whether in a foreclosure
proceeding brought by a trustee, the holders of bonds secured by
the trust deed are necessary or proper parties to the suit. In an
action brought by Firebaugh as trustee to foreclose upon the
trust deed given to secure a bond issue of $160,000, the issue in
the case was the necessity of joining the bondholders as parties.
During the course of the proceedings, a subpoena duces tecum
was served upon Firebaugh to compel him to produce the list of
-the names and addresses of the holders and owners of the bonds
secured by the trust deed under foreclosure. For a refusal to
comply with the order, Firebaugh was adjudged guilty of contempt.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the court, in order -to
decide the validity of the commitment for contempt, had to consider and pass upon the validity .of the subpoena issued. by the
master in chancery. The court held, in reversing the Superior
Court, that the order requiring the production of the lists was
invalid, and that Firebaugh was not in contempt of court for
his failure to comply therewith. The court based its decision on
the ground that the names were not material to prove any alle24
25

Perry on Trusts, 11, sec. 487.
Lewin's Practical Treatise on the Law of Trusts (13th Ed.), p. 945.

1353 111. 82, 186 N. E. 526.
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gations under which the master was proceeding to take testimony for the reason that the bondholders were not necessary or
proper parties to the foreclosure proceedings.
To consider properly the issue decided in this case, it is necessary to go afield somewhat and trace the early English cases
from which this principle has been derived. From the time of
its inception the principle was maintained for the purpose of
convenience and to secure a remedy where otherwise it might be
lost.
The early English cases while not involving bondholders as
such, did involve the principle of representation, which is the
principle applied in allowing the trustee to sue for and on behalf
of the bondholders. John Adams 2 states that where several persons have distinct rights in a common fund and they are very
numerous, one has been allowed to sue on behalf of all.
This was true of the early cases in England brought by seamen
to recover for their share of the profits derived from engaging
in privateering. In the case of Leigh v. Thomas,s which was a
bill filed to compel an accounting of the prize money recovered
for the capture of a ship, the bill was filed by two of the seamen
who had been appointed by sixty-four of a crew of eighty to
maintain the action on behalf of the whole crew. A demurrer
was filed to the bill for want of necessary parties. The court
in sustaining the demurrer stated that as a general rule all persons interested had to be made pdrties to the suit, but recognized,
as a practical exception, that where, due to the number of interested parties, it is impossible to make them all parties, the action
might be maintained by a few on behalf of the whole. The demurrer was sustained because the complainants failed to establish their authority to bring the action on behalf of the whole.
In a later case 4 of a like nature, the court allowed the action
stating that due to the uncertainty of the whereabouts or existence of seamen, the action could be maintained by one on behalf
of all in order not to deprive those who were entitled to relief
of a chance to bring their action.
Another group of early English cases5 in which a like principle was applied were those cases wherein several creditors sued
a common debtor. Likewise, in those cases6 where several legatees sought recovery against the executor, the courts held that
the executor was also a trustee, and an adjudication binding
upon him as to the trust res would bind all the legatees, who
(4th Am. Ed.), p. 674.
2 Ves. Sr. 312, 28 Eng. Rep. 201.
4 Good v. Blewitt, 13 Ves. Jr. 397, 33 Eng. Rep. 343.
5 Adair v. The New River Co., 11 Yes. Jr. 429, 32 Eng. Rep. 1153.
6 Allen v. Knight, 5 Hare 272, 67 Eng. Rep. 915.
2 John Adams, The Doctrine of Equity,
3
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were the cestuis que trustent. It is from these cases that Story"
reaches the conclusion that the rights of the creditors or legatees
will be bound by the decision of the court when fairly obtained
for or against the trustees on behalf of the cestuis que trustent.
Decisions in the English land cases s followed, in which land
was bought with a joint fund raised by subscriptions, and held
by trustees for the benefit of the several subscribers. By virtue
of the agreement, the trustee was given full power to control the
land subject only to the terms of the undertaking. The courts in
handling actions pertaining to the trust res under such circumstances held that the trustee was the party necessary to appear,
and that he sufficiently represented the subscribers. These cases,
though not directly in point, are the forerunners of the cases
involving the rights of the bondholders.
One of the earliest cases in the United States was that of Hays
v. Dorsey, 9 in which the trustee filed a bill to foreclose the trust
deed. By way of defense, objection was made to the bill on the
ground that the cestui que trust had not been joined as a party
complainant. The court held that the trustee is the proper party
to file a bill to foreclose, and that the cestui que trust need not
be made a party.
The development of the entire theory underlying the trust
deed as security for a bond issue was given a great impetus in
the growth and expansion of the railroads in the United States.10
In the case of Shaw et al. v. Norfolk County Railroad Company
et al.,1 a trust deed had been executed to secure a bond issue
floated to raise funds for the construction of the railroad. Subsequently a bill was filed by the trustee in the trust deed to foreclose the trust deed. The railroad company filed a demurrer setting forth the failure to join the bondholders as complainants in
the bill. The court overruled the demurrer, stating that the bondholders need not be made parties to the bill brought by the
trustee to foreclose the trust deed.
The case of Wright et al. v. Bundy 12 was also a case in which
the trustee in a trust deed executed by a railroad company filed
a bill in equity to foreclose the trust deed. In its answer, the
railroad sought a dismissal for failure to join the beneficiaries
as complainants. In overruling the contention of the defendant,
the court held that the beneficiaries under a trust deed, in an
action brought by the trustee to foreclose the trust deed, are not
necessary parties and need not be joined for any purpose.
7 Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, (9th Ed.), sec. 150.
8 Alexander v. Cana, 1 De G. and Sin. 415, 63 Eng. Rep. 1129; Meux v.
Maltby, 2 Swans. 277, 36 Eng. Rep. 621.
905 Md. 99.
' James G. Smith, American Law Review, Nov.-Dec. 1927, pp. 900-911.
115 Gray 162 (Mass.).

12 11 Ind. 398.
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Pomeroy13 makes the statement that the trustee, being vested
with the legal interest, is the proper person to institute or defend actions involving the trust res, and to do such other things
as can be done only by the one having the legal estate. It is
evident that the trust res is considered as being solely under the
control of the trustee and, therefore, in actions involving the
trust res as such, the trustee is deemed to be the proper party
to deal in respect thereto.
A New Jersey equity case, 14 while recognizing the general doctrine by its decision, placed a slight restriction upon it. This
was a bill for foreclosure by the trustee under the trust deed. The
defendant filed a demurrer to the bill, assigning as ground for
the demurrer the want of the bondholders as parties complainant. The court in overruling the demurrer held that as a general
requirement, in those cases where there are a large number of
persons, some of whom may even be unknown to the orators, the
courts of equity have permitted the orators to maintain the bill
notwithstanding the want of parties, where it is plainly shown
that the interests of the absent persons are sufficiently represented by the orators of the bill. By its decision, however, the
court intimated that the exception would not be invoked where
the beneficiaries were few in number or actually known to the
complainants. It is quite probable that the court in its opinion
in this case 15 was attempting to apply the equitable doctrine of
representation that courts of equity, in applying the general
principle in regard to the necessity for all interested persons
being joined as parties to the suit, never allow it to produce
inconvenience; and, therefore, where a joinder of all interested
persons is practically impossible because they are unknown or too
numerous,
one or more may sue or be sued on behalf of the
16
whole.
Although the procedure of allowing the trustee to sue for and
on behalf of the cestuis que trustent is somewhat akin to the
doctrine of representation, the two are not one and the same, and
can be readily distinguished. Under the theory of the doctrine
of representation each one of the several persons interested have
an equal right to assert; and, in order not to deprive some of
their right, they are allowed to bring the suit for themselves and
on behalf of the others. Where the trustee sues for and on behalf
of the cestuis que trustent, the right to bring suit is vested in
13 J. N. Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence as Administered in the
United States of America, (Students' Edition), p. 550, sec. 989.
14 Camden Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Dialogue, 75 N. J. Eq. 600, 72 A.
358.

15 Camden Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Dialogue, 75 N. J. Eq. 600, 72 A.
358.
16 Mitford's and Tylor's Pleadings and Practice in Equity, p. 22.
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him, and, as a general proposition, the cestuis que trustent do
not have any right or power to initiate a suit.17 The attitude of
the courts in respect to this question was ably stated in the case
of The New Jersey Franklinite Company v. Ames,18 wherein the
court said that "The cestuis que trustent of a trust deed given
to secure a bonded indebtedness were not necessary parties to a
bill brought by the trustee to foreclose, whether the trust deed
constituted a prior or subsequent encumbrance, or whether the
trustee was complainant or defendant.
The courts have gone even further in holding that the trustee
is the proper party to suits involving the trust deed as such, as
in the case of Miller and Knapp v. The Rutland and Washington
Railroad Company et al.19 In this case the railroad company
had executed three separate trust deeds each of which was given
to secure an independent bond issue. It developed that the first
trust deed was defectively executed, in that it was signed by the
president of the railroad in his individual capacity and not as
president. In an action brought by the trustees of the first trust
deed to foreclose upon it, the trustees of the second and third
trust deeds were made defendants. The defective execution of
the first trust deed was raised in an attempt to have the second
and third trust deeds declared as prior liens. The decree gave
priority to the first trust deed when it was proved that the
trustees of the other two trust deeds had had actual knowledge
of the first trust deed at the time their trust deeds were executed. Objection was made by the bondholders under the second
and third trust deeds, but the court refused to change the decree,
stating that the knowledge of the trustees was binding upon the
bondholders.
A Wisconsin case 20 similar in substance was decided in the
same way. Here the action was brought by the trustee under
the first trust deed to close out the second trust deed. Only the
trustee of the second trust deed was made defendant, and objection was made that a final decree could not be rendered without
making the bondholders parties. In granting the relief prayed
for, the court held that the rights of the bondholders were fairly
and fully represented by the trustee, could be adequately tried
without making the bondholders parties, and therefore the bondholders did not have to be joined as parties to the suit.
17 Sturges and Douglass v. Knapp et al., 31 Vt. 1; Seibert v. Minneapolis and
St. Louis Railroad Co. et al., 52 Minn. 148, 53 N. W. 1134; Van Vechten and
Sebring v. Terry et al., 2 Johns. Ch. 197 (N. Y.); Halsted v. Tyng et al., 3
Green 375 (N. J. Eq.).
18 1 Beasley 507 (N. J. Eq.).
19 36 Vt. 452.
20 Tile Board of Supervisors v. The Mineral Point Railroad Company et al.,
24 Wis. 93.
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An action was brought to set aside a trust deed as being fraudulent in the case of Winslow v. The Minnesota and Pacific Railroad Company et al.21 The trustee was made a party defendant
as the party in interest in respect to the trust deed. A petition
was filed by a bondholder asking leave of court to intervene and
defend, alleging that the trustee was not performing his duties
as required by the trust deed. The court stated that, in general,
where an action is brought to set aside a trust deed, the bondholders are not necessary parties; but if facts exist to justify so
doing, the bondholders may, in the discretion of the court, be
admitted to defend. The petition in this particular case was denied for failure on the part of the petitioner to establish sufficiently the necessity for intervention.
A large volume of case law concerning this question is to be
found in the cases arising in the Federal courts. A typical case
illustrating this point is Smith v. Bell.2 2 This was a bill filed
by the trustee to foreclose the trust deed. There was only one
(estui que trust. The defendant, grantor, questioned the jurisdiction of the Federal court, alleging that both he and the
cestui que trust were residents of Oklahoma. The trustee was a
,:esident of Pennsylvania. The court overruled the objection and
granted the prayer of the bill. In sustaining its ruling the court
held that the citizenship and residence of the trustee in the trust
deed, and not that of the beneficiary, determines the jurisdiction
of a Federal court to entertain a suit to foreclose the trust deed,
because the trustee is, and the beneficiary is not, an indispensable
party to the suit.
For proper authority pertaining to the capacity of the trustee
to bring the suit on behalf of the cestuis que trustent in a Federal
court, it is necessary to refer to the equity rules 23 of the Federal
courts. Rule 37 states, in part, that every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real person in interest, but a trustee
of an express trust may sue in his own name without joining
with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought. The
context of this rule makes it evident that the right to bring or
defend 24any action concerning the trust deed is vested in the
trustee.
The trustee is not only the proper and necessary party to the
suit when he himself brings the action or is the party defendant
actually being sued, but also in such cases where the trust res is
21 4 Minn. 313.
22 217 F. 243.
28 United States Code Annotated, Equity Rules, Title 28, Rule 37.
24 Kerrison et al. v. Stewart et al., 93 U. S. 155. See also Port Wentworth
Terminal Corp. et al. v. Equitable Trust Co. of New York, 18 F. (2d) 379;
American Tube and Iron Co. v. Kentucky Southern Oil and Gas Company
et al., 51 F. 826.
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involved incidentally. In all such cases where the trust res as
such is involved in litigation, the trustee is the necessary party
to the suit, and the bondholders need not be joined. 25 From the
character and nature of his undertaking, the trustee is under
the supervision and control of the equity courts, and is held
strictly accountable for his conduct. Therefore the courts conclude that the trustee can be relied on to supervise sufficiently
the interests of his cestuis que trustent.
The courts recognize that under special circumstances it is
occasionally advisable to allow a bondholder or bondholders to
intervene. The extent to which the courts exercise this qualification is to be found expressed in the case of Investment Registry,
Limited v. Chicago and Milwaukee Electric Railroad Company
et al.26 The trustee of the trust deed involved in this case filed a
bill asking for the appointment of a receiver. A holder of some
of the bonds secured by the trust deed involved in this case filed
a petition asking leave of court to intervene, setting forth as the
necessity for intervention, facts tending to show a partiality in
the trustee detrimental to the bondholders, disqualifying him as
the true representative of the bondholders. The petition was
denied by the court. In dismissing the petition, the court held
that the right of the bondholders to intervene depended upon a
showing of good cause; and held further that both the reasonableness of the cause and the method of determining the cause
was discretionary with the court. The court held that it could
hear and base the ruling as to the prayer of the petition upon
the petition itself, upon the merits of the entire case, upon the
return made in compliance with a rule to show cause, or upon
all of them combined. It would appear from this decision that
the courts were rather reluctant to grant petitions to intervene.
A further consideration of cases in which bondholders sought
to intervene will make it clear that the courts are hesitant in
allowing intervention. After the trustee had recovered a decree
of foreclosure subject to specified conditions, several bondholders
filed a petition to intervene for the purpose of having the conditions stricken from the decree.2 7 The court held that the
trustee represents the bondholders and, if he acts in good faith,
whatever binds him binds them, although they are not actual
parties to the suit; that they had no right, therefore, to be made
parties, except where the trustee acted in bad faith; and that
in fact the trustee here had acted properly.
In all the cases where the bondholders sought to intervene,
the courts consistently held that the right to intervene did not
Carpenter et al. v. Knollwood Cemetery et al., 198 F. 297.
20 213 F. 492.
27 Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Kansas City, Wyandotte & Northwestern
R. Co. et al., 53 F. 182.
25

CASE NOTES

exist as a matter of right but was discretionary with the court. 28
Although the cases vary in their statement as to what would be
sufficient ground to justify an intervention, the one underlying
element to be found in them all is the existence of bad faith in
the trustee. The court in Bowling Green Trust Company v. Virginia Passenger and Power Company29 said that a court should
be slow to interfere with a trustee in the apparent discharge of
his duties, especially so where the purpose of the intervention is
not to seek actual relief but to obstruct the trustee in the discharge of his duties.
In two cases in which the trustee was alleged to be representing
conflicting interests and therefore incapable of faithfully performing his trust as to each interest, the court in each case
considered the petition on the basis of whether there was an
actual necessity for intervention in order to protect the interests of the bondholders. The petition in the one case3" alleged
that the trustee was trustee in twelve trust deeds upon the property of one railroad to secure as many bond issues, all of which
were being foreclosed. In the foreclosure proceedings, however,
a receiver had been appointed to administer the closing of the
several bond issues. The court in denying the petition said that
the mere fact that the same trustee is trustee under twelve trust
deeds is not of itself sufficient ground for allowing intervention
by the bondholders, in the absence of a showing of negligence on
the part of the trustee or that there are conflicting interests between the several cestuis que trustent.
The other eases' was a bill to foreclose filed by the trustee who
represented several classes of bondholders. A petition to intervene was filed asking that a representative group of each class
of bondholders be appointed and allowed to appear in the case
on behalf of their class. The court granted the relief asked for
by the petition, holding that where the same trustee represents
several classes of bondholders, in the same property, whose interests are antagonistic, each class will be allowed to have an
independent representative.
Illinois courts have consistently followed the principle of representation in such cases. The case of The Chicago and Great
Western Railroad Land Company et al. v. Peck et al.82 is fre28 Wetmore et al. v. St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Co., 3 F. 177; Brown v.
Denver Omnibus and Cab Co. et al., 254 F. 560; Continental and Commercial
Trust and Savings Bank v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 200 F. 600; Palmer v. Bankers'
Trust Co. et al., 12 F. (2d) 747; Elwell v. Fosdick et al., 134 U. S. 500.
29 132 F. 921.
30 Clyde et al. v. Richmond and Danville R. Co. et al. (In Re Brown et al.),

55 F. 445.
81 Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co. et al., 66
F. 169.
U 112 IMl.408.
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quently cited by the courts in later decisions as having established the principle as applied in Illinois. It was there held that
as a general rule of chancery procedure all persons interested in
the subject matter of a suit had to be made parties and in an
action to foreclose upon a trust deed the cestuis que trustent as
well as the trustee should be made parties to the bill. The court
further held that where the beneficiaries are very numerous and
are sufficiently represented by their trustee, they need not all
be made parties; the impracticability of making all the beneficiaries parties is sufficient reason for dispensing with the general rule. The principle as thus expressed has been followed ever
83
since.
From the decisions in all the cases considered herein, it can
be concluded that the court in its ruling in the Firebaugh case
followed and applied the principle that is approved and upheld
in practically all the courts. Furthermore, taking into consideration the nature of a trust deed, the relation of the trustee
to the cestuis que trustent, and his duties in regard thereto, the
adopted principle is the proper one to be applied.
38 The St. Louis & Peoria R. Co. v. Kerr et al., 153 I1. 182; The Farmer's
Loan and Trust Co. v. The Lake Street Elevated R. Co. et al., 173 Ill. 439; Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Illinois Merchants Trust Co., 329 Ill. 334; Chandler
v. O'Neil, 62 Ill. App. 418; Breed v. Baird, 139 Ill. App. 15; American Trust
and Safe Deposit Co. v. 180 East Delaware Building Corp. et al., 262 Ill. App.
67. In view of the language of sections 23 and 24 of the Illinois Civil Practice
Act it is not probable that the practice heretofore prevailing will be disturbed.

